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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 
John Dwight Ingram 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When I entered the job market more than fifty years ago, most 
people expected to work for their initial employers for their entire 
careers, and indeed many have done just that.  Presently, that is no 
longer the case.  Many people will change employers, and even 
industries, several times over their working years.  This increased 
mobility has added greatly to the opportunities of workers, but it has also 
created serious problems for employers who want to protect their trade 
secrets, confidential information, and goodwill.  To accomplish this 
protection, many employers require at least some of their employees to 
agree that they will not, upon the termination of their employment, 
reveal trade secrets or confidential information, or work in a similar 
position in a geographic area where they would have an opportunity to 
take away the former employer’s goodwill. 
This article will discuss the enforceability of covenants not to 
compete when they are used in commercial business settings.  There will 
be no discussion of the forms of relief1 available if a court determines 
that a covenant is enforceable.  Also omitted from this article are 
noncompetition agreements which accompany the sale of a business or 
dissolution of a partnership.2  Finally, a discussion concerning covenants 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. E.g., injunction, compensatory and liquidated damages.  Examples of both injunctive 
relief and liquidated damages are included in Washel v. Bryant, 770 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002).  In that case, Bryant worked as a hair stylist at Hi-Tek beauty salon, and she signed a non-
compete agreement stating that she would not open a competing beauty shop within ten miles of Hi-
Tek within the two years after her employment at Hi-Tek ended.  Id. at 905.  The Appeals Court 
determined that a liquidated damages clause within the non-compete agreement was not adequate 
compensation for Hi-Tek’s owner, and the court reversed the lower court’s denial of injunctive 
relief.  Id. at 908. 
 2. Covenants in such situations are more readily enforced by the courts because buyer and 
seller, or former partners, usually have equal bargaining power, and the “good will” of the business 
is an important and valued asset.  See, e.g., Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Chronister Oil Co., 687 F. 
1
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not to compete between professionals (attorneys, physicians, etc.) will 
not be a part of this current article. 
In most states today, courts will enforce a covenant not to compete 
if the covenant is found to be “reasonable,” that is, the length of time, 
geographic scope, and type of activities restricted are necessary to 
protect the former employer’s business such as preserving the former 
employer’s relationships with its customers.3  In determining the 
covenant’s reasonableness, courts will ask two questions: (1) Does the 
employer have a protectable interest? and (2) Is the restrictive covenant 
reasonably related to protecting that interest?4 
Over the years, courts have “looked upon [non-compete] 
agreements with disfavor, [and they have been] cautiously considered, 
and carefully scrutinized.”5  Two reasons are usually given for this 
attitude: (1) Employees should be free to make the best possible bargain 
for his6 labor,7 and (2) the public has an interest in maximizing available 
services.8 
                                                                                                                                 
Supp. 437, 439 (C.D. Ill. 1988); Weitekamp v. Lane, 620 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  
Note, however, that dissolving partnerships between law partners are handled much like standard 
non-compete clauses in other states. See Benjamin H. Parr, Restricting a Lawyer’s Right to 
Practice: Will Courts Uphold Noncompetition Agreements Between Law Partners?, 26 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 243, 246 (2002) (noting that California uses the same reasonableness standard used by other 
states to measure similar non-competition clauses in other career fields).  See also the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993), where the California 
high court laid down this opinion. 
 3. See, e.g., Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d 426, 433 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1987).  Additionally, labor and employment law are now commanded by the harsh realities of 
overbroad covenants not to compete. See Thomas M. Winn, III, Labor & Employment Law, 37 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 241 (2002), (reviewing Mona Electric Group, Inc. v. Truland Serv. Corp., 193 F. 
Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Va. 2002), which found that although the non-solicitation covenant was void, 
the ex-employee did not violate the covenant because the former employer’s customers contacted 
him rather than him soliciting the customers). 
 4. See generally, Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Bredeson, 437 N.W.2d 698, 703-04 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the reasonableness standard is found by examining all the relevant 
portions of the non-competition contract itself). 
 5. Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965) (citing Arthur Murray 
Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17 (Ohio Misc. 1952)).  Additionally, see 
Richard E. Johnson & Richard G. Greenstein, Achieving “Victory Through Prearrangements” 
Supplementing Covenants Not to Compete, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 21, 21 (2002), which generally 
discusses judicial disfavor of non-competition clauses.  The authors note that courts look poorly 
upon non-competition clauses as a form of trade and that five courts have even invalidated them 
altogether.  Id. 
 6. This article uses the personal pronoun he when a choice between he and she is necessary. 
 7. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (Minn. 1920). 
 8. See Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1980). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss1/2
INGRAM1.DOC 1/6/03  2:46 PM 
2002] COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 51 
II. PROTECT GOODWILL 
A restraint on post-employment competition may be justified where 
part of the former employee’s compensated services includes the 
creation of goodwill9 with customers or clients, who would be likely to 
follow the employee and patronize his competing business.  A restraint 
is not justified if the harm to the former employer results simply from 
the fact that the former employee will be a competent and effective 
competitor.10  The skills, experience, and knowledge which an employee 
acquires during his employment are his assets, and are not a protectable 
business interest of his former employer.11  When the employment 
relationship ends, the employee has a right to take those assets with 
him.12  However, as I will discuss infra in Part III, an employee may not 
take with him the employer’s trade secrets or confidential information.  
It is often difficult to draw the line between knowledge, skill, and 
experience, on the one hand, and trade secrets and confidential 
                                                                                                                                 
 9. “‘Good will is generally understood to mean the advantage that accrues to a business on 
account of its name, location and reputation, which tends to enable it to retain the patronage of its 
old customers.’”  Allied Adjustment Serv. v. Heney, 484 A.2d 1189, 1191 (N.H. 1984) (citation 
omitted). 
 10. See Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 794, 799 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (citation 
omitted).  For a discussion on how to avoid such competition problems, see generally, Victoria A. 
Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to Prevent Departing Employees From Putting Your Trade 
Secrets to Work for Your Competitors., 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 301 (1992), 
where the author notes: 
A company intent on protecting its trade secrets must first identify those secrets.  It must 
then take steps to place its employees on reasonable notice that such information is to be 
kept confidential, both during employment and afterwards.  Otherwise, employees 
cannot be expected to maintain the information in confidence.  The company must 
establish appropriate procedures to limit access to confidential information to the 
minimum number of employees or consultants reasonably consistent with the business 
needs of the company.  Finally, when the employee or consultant departs, the company 
must get continuing agreements that the information will remain confidential. 
  Particular circumstances may dictate more rigorous protective measures. State law 
permitting, restrictive covenants may be appropriate to prevent certain employees from 
working in competitive positions for a reasonable period of time.  Upon learning of new 
employment that threatens to place the first employer’s trade secrets at risk, it may be 
necessary to commence detailed negotiations with the new employer to ensure that the 
employee will not be assigned to areas that inevitably put the company’s secrets at risk.  
If these strategies fail, it may be necessary to commence litigation seeking an injunction 
against activities likely to lead to use or disclosure of trade secrets.  While different 
secrets may dictate somewhat different strategies, the company’s overriding concern—
before hiring the new employee or consultant, during employment, and upon departure—
must always be to determine the most reasonable and effective way of protecting its 
confidential information. 
Id. at 303-04. 
 11. Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 1955). 
 12. Id. 
3
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information on the other.13 
A. Near-Permanent Relationship With Customers 
Establishing an employer’s protectable goodwill often can be 
accomplished by showing the employer’s “near-permanent relationship” 
with its customers, with whom the employee would not have dealt but 
for his employment.14  If the employee knew a customer prior to his 
employment, or if the customers’ identities could be found in telephone 
or trade directories, or in other public sources, the employer could not 
establish the “but for” requirement.15 
In determining whether “near-permanent” customer relationships 
exist, many courts will look to the following factors: 
(1) the number of years required to develop the clientele; (2) the 
amount of money invested to acquire clients; (3) the degree of 
difficulty in acquiring clients; (4) the extent of personal customer 
contact by the employee; (5) the extent of the employer’s knowledge 
of its clients; (6) the duration of the customers’ association with the 
employer; and (7) the continuity of employer-customer relationships.16 
It is not necessary for the employer to show a “customer 
relationship is perpetual or indissoluble, or that a nearpermanent 
                                                                                                                                 
 13. See Fowler, 598 A.2d at 798. 
 14. Abbott-Interfast Corp. v. Harkabus, 619 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  Scholars 
note that the “near-permanent relationship” is one of two legitimate business interests that make 
covenants not to compete judicially acceptable.  See Gene A. Petersen, Understanding Illinois 
Noncompetition Agreements and Restrictive Covenants, 89 ILL. BAR J. 472 (2001).  Petersen 
extensively discusses trade secrets and how they alone, without a showing of a “near-permanent” 
relationship with the employer’s customers, can be enough of a basis to enforce a restrictive 
covenant.  Id. at 473. 
 15. See Com-Co Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Serv. Ins. Agency, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2001); Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 444-45 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).  Essentially, there must have been no way that the former employee could have 
discovered the client outside the course of his employment with their former employee.  Petersen, 
supra note 14, at 474-75. 
 16. Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 524 N.E.2d 947, 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (citation omitted).  
Peterson, supra note 14, at 474-75 (noting additional factors for judicial review).  Peterson notes 
that: 
A near-permanent relationship with clients is inherent in the provision of professional 
services. Conversely, a near-permanent relationship with customers is generally absent 
from businesses engaged in sales. Moreover, a near-permanent relationship is not 
generally present in a business which does not engender customer loyalty by providing a 
unique product or personal service, and customers of the business utilize many suppliers 
simultaneously to meet their needs. 
Id. (citing Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Mileham, 620 N.E.2d 479, 488-89 (1993)). 
4
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relationship existed with each customer.”17  “Nor does the employer 
have to have an exclusive relationship with its clients to satisfy the 
nearpermanent test.”18 
A situation which was found by the court to satisfy the 
requirements for a “near-permanent” relationship can be found in 
McRand, Inc. v. Beelen.19  There, the employer designed and coordinated 
incentive award programs for businesses.20  It took one to three years to 
identify and develop each major account, and required an investment of 
about $200,000.21  Thereafter, the employer maintained continuing 
relations with its customers.22 
Similarly, in The Instrumentalist Co. v. Band, Inc.,23 the former 
employee had exercised near-exclusive authority for contacting and 
servicing the 40 to 50 major advertisers in the former employer’s band 
and orchestra magazine.24  He had close personal and business ties to the 
people who made advertising decisions at these firms.25 
B. Consideration For The Restriction 
It is generally held that to be valid and enforceable, a covenant not 
to compete must be ancillary to the principal employment agreement.26  
The basis for this requirement is to insure that the purpose of the 
restriction is not simply to avoid competition, but rather to protect some 
                                                                                                                                 
 17. Audio Properties, Inc. v. Kovach, 655 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (citation 
omitted). 
 18. Id. (citation omitted). 
 19. 486 N.E.2d 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
 20. Id. at 1309. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  See also Millard Maint. Serv. Co., v. Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990) (finding a near permanent relationship existed because the employer “devoted substantial 
resources to developing and maintaining a clientele, [and] . . . made an effort to develop and 
maintain close personal relationships with the decision-makers in firms that were [its] customers 
through social outings and personal visits. . . .  Finally, five of [the employer’s] largest customers 
[had] done business with [the employer] in excess of 15 years”). 
 23. 480 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
 24. Id. at 1280-81. 
 25. Id. at 1281. 
 26. See, e.g., Marine Contractors Co., Inc. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1974) 
(finding the covenant was ancillary to employment and enforceable); Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 
883 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. 1994) (finding the covenant unenforceable because it was not ancillary 
to an otherwise enforceable agreement).  For a more elaborate discussion on Massachusetts 
restrictive covenants, see Christine M. O’Malley, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts 
Hi-Tech Industry: Assessing the Need For a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1218-23 
(1999).  O’Malley describes the general Massachusetts law concerning restrictive covenants and 
explains how the recent law has changed since the ruling in Marine Contractors. Id. 
5
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legitimate interest of the employer under the principal agreement.27  
Some courts, however, have held that “[a] restrictive covenant 
agreement may meet the requirements for ancillarity if it is ancillary to 
an employment relationship even though the employment may lack a 
written agreement and remain at will.”28 
Most courts require that there be an adequate consideration to 
support a covenant not to compete.29  Where the employee agrees to the 
restriction at the beginning of the employment relationship, most courts 
hold that the employer’s promise of employment constitutes sufficient 
consideration to support the covenant not to compete.30  However, if the 
covenant is agreed to at any time after initial employment, many courts 
will enforce it only if new consideration was given to the employee.31  
Such additional consideration may consist of an increase in 
compensation, a new (usually higher) position, a bonus or stock 
incentive program, or an extended fixed term of employment.32  Mere 
                                                                                                                                 
 27. Marine Contractors, 310 N.E.2d at 920. 
 28. See, e.g., Woodfield Group, Inc. v. DeLisle, 693 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) 
(emphasis added). 
 29. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 945-47 (7th Cir. 1994); Modern 
Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1978); Nat’l Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Gagliardi Bros., Inc. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 
525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that Pennsylvania requires adequate consideration); Millard Maint. 
Serv. Co., 566 N.E.2d at 384 (noting that Illinois requires adequate consideration). 
 30. Nat’l Risk Mgmt., Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 429 (noting that new consideration is necessary 
where covenants not to compete are signed after the beginning of the employee’s employment).  See 
In re Verdi, 244 B.R. 314, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that new consideration such as stock, 
special training, promotions, or pay raises would be necessary in order to complete significant 
consideration for these new covenants not to compete). 
 31. See, e.g., Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
Nat’l Recruiters Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn. 1982) as stating that “proof of 
continued employment is not enough to show sufficient consideration for a noncompetition 
agreement”).  The court found there was no new consideration because there was “no evidence that 
[the employee] was promoted, or that increases in salary and supervisory duties were attributable to 
anything other than the performance that was expected of him under the initial employment 
agreement.”  Id.  In fact, some scholars have noted that unless the noncompetition agreement is 
signed before employment begins, then some other consideration would be necessary.  See William 
Christopher Penwell, Litigating Covenants Not to Compete, 59 BENCH & B. MINN. 27 (2002).  
Penwell notes that even if covenants not to compete are signed on the day that employment begins, 
a separate consideration may be necessary other than the simple promise of employment. Id. at 27. 
 32. See, e.g., Modern Controls, 578 F.2d at 1267; McRand, 486 N.E.2d at 1314 (finding 
continued employment with greater responsibilities sufficient); Nat’l Recruiters, 323 N.W.2d at 740 
(noting that promotion and increased responsibility can be sufficient, but “continued employment 
alone [is] not sufficient [consideration] to support [a] covenant [signed after accepting 
employment]”).  Discussions continue on whether to abandon both the “continued consideration” 
doctrine and other general restrictions on restrictive covenants, particularly in the legal business 
setting.  See Kenneth Engel, Note, Should Minnesota Abandon the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm 
Noncompetition Agreements?, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 133 (1997).  With more legal 
6
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continuation of employment is usually held to be insufficient 
consideration to support a covenant not to compete,33 although some 
courts have held it to be sufficient if the employment continues 
thereafter for a substantial period of time.34  As a corollary to this, one 
court stated that this requirement creates “an irrebuttable presumption 
that if the employee was fired shortly after he signed the covenant the 
consideration for the covenant was illusory.”35 
III. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
A. What is a Trade Secret? 
Trade secrets have been defined as “a plan or process, tool, 
mechanism, compound, or informational data utilized by a person in his 
business operations and known only to him and such limited other 
persons to whom it may be necessary to confide it.”36  In determining 
what constitutes a trade secret, courts often consider the factors listed in 
Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts: 
[1] the extent to which the information is known outside of his 
business; [2] the extent to which it is known by employees and others 
involved in his business; [3] the extent of measures taken by him to 
guard the secrecy of the information; [4] the value of the information 
to him and to his competitors; [5] the amount of effort or money 
expended by him in developing the information; [6] the ease or 
                                                                                                                                 
partnerships splintering off into new firms, many commentators see a strong policy behind insuring 
confidentiality agreements and other closely held information picked up at the original firm.  Id. at 
137-38. 
 33. But see Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 778, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  The 
rationale for allowing continued employment to suffice as consideration seems to be a recognition 
of substance over form.  See McRand, 486 N.E.2d at 1314 (stating that to hold otherwise “would 
force the employer to fire [the employee] and rehire him the next day after the covenant had been 
signed”). 
 34. Curtis 1000, 24 F.3d at 946; See also Millard Maint. Serv. Co., 566 N.E.2d at 384 (noting 
that in Illinois “continuous employment constitutes adequate consideration” for a non-compete 
covenant). 
 35. Curtis 1000, 24 F.3d at 946.  Employees must be wary of the conditions behind these 
covenants when they sign them.  The presentation of these covenants for employee approval usually 
does not give ample opportunity to the new employee to take a hard look at the actual contents of 
the covenant.  See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A 
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. 
L. REV. 1163 (2001) (noting that new employees will be hesitant to take a long look at the language 
behind these covenants since the last thing they want to do is challenge their boss on the day they 
are hired). 
 36. ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971). 
7
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difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others.37 
Some uniformity has been brought to this area of the law by the 
adoption in most states of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, (U.T.S.A.), 
which permits employers to bring an action based merely on a “threat of 
misappropriation of a trade secret.”38  The U.T.S.A. defines a trade 
secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy.39 
Unlike the requirement for patentability, novelty is not required to 
have a protectable trade secret, because a trade secret is not protected 
against independent creation, whereas a patent is.40  However, there must 
be some degree of novelty, since that which is generally known will not 
be deemed to be a secret.41 
                                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1946)). 
 38. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (1985), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1985). 
 39. Id. § 1(4).  See, e.g., Packaging House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 448 N.E.2d 947, 948 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1983) (finding that the employer’s customer list was a trade secret since it was “marked 
‘Confidential’[and] . . . kept on . . . [the] premises under lock and key . . . [with a] security system” 
to which only certain people had access, and [that] all “costs and pricing information [was also kept] 
in a secured and confidential manner” so as to also be trade secrets).  Unlike the limitations usually 
applied to noncompetition agreements, the U.T.S.A. provides that a duty or agreement to limit the 
use of trade secrets will “not be deemed to be void or unenforceable solely for lack of durational or 
geographical limitation on the duty.”  U.T.S.A. § 1(4). 
 40. Note, however, that novelty is more of a gray area due to recent technological 
innovations.  See Victoria A. Cundiff, Protecting Trade Secrets From Disclosure On the Internet 
Requires Diligent Practice, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 15 (2002) (noting that unlike patent law, where a 
single reference can destroy its novelty, the trade secret test is whether or not the secret is “generally 
known”).  Simply because something is posted a number of times on the internet does not 
necessarily mean that it is “generally known,” however, as the internet becomes even more 
widespread, that idea may begin to alter.  Id. at 15-16. 
 41. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).  The novelty principal 
works conversely in encryption cases dealing with intellectual property rights, since no degree of 
novelty must be shown in order to receive copyright protection.  Brian Bolinger, Focusing on 
Infringement: Why Limitations on Decryption Technology are Not the Solution to Policing 
Copyright, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (2002). 
8
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Public policy generally favors the right and opportunity for workers 
to better themselves by changing jobs.42  While it is certainly true that 
[a]n employer who discloses valuable information to his employee in 
confidence is entitled to protection against the use of these secrets in 
competition with him[.] . . . [t]he employee who possesses the 
employer’s most valuable confidences is apt to be highly skilled.  The 
public is interested in the reasonable mobility of such skilled persons 
from job to job in our fluid society, which is characterized by and 
requires the mobility of technically expert persons from place to place, 
from job to job and upward within the industrial structure. And the 
employee himself must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to change 
jobs without abandoning the ability to practice his skills.43 
There is an inherent and inevitable conflict in trying to distinguish 
between trade secrets and the employee’s developed skills, knowledge, 
and experience.  Public policy favors employment mobility for 
employees, but it also seeks to promote invention and innovation, which 
requires reasonable protection for the employer to assure that employees 
who are necessarily given the use of trade secrets are prohibited from 
using or disclosing them in a new position.44 
While historically most people have thought of “trade secrets” as 
being inventions or innovations in the production and distribution of 
products, more recently the definition of “trade secrets” has greatly 
expanded.45  It is now commonly held to include information about sales 
and marketing, such as pricing, information about customers, plans and 
strategies for new products and services, and so on.46 
However, as I have indicated above, since courts do not favor 
limiting an employee’s future work opportunities, they are likely to 
                                                                                                                                 
 42. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967).  This policy is 
greatly contested by employers, however, and is one of the main motivations behind covenants not 
to compete.  See Katherine V.W. Stone, Human Capital and Employee Mobility: A Rejoinder, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 1233 (2002). Another doctrine which has helped employers cut down on employee 
mobility is the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in trade secret law.  David Lincicum, Inevitable 
Conflict?: California’s Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1257 (2002). 
 43. Standard Brands, 264 F. Supp. at 259 (emphasis added). 
 44. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 45. See, e.g., Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1117-18 (8th Cir. 1996); 
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Lumex, Inc. v. 
Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 629-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Wessel Co., Inc. v. Busa, 329 N.E.2d 414 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
 46. See, e.g., Roton Barrier, 79 F.3d at 1117-18; IDS Life Ins., 958 F. Supp. at 1279; Lumex, 
919 F. Supp. at 629-30; Wessel Co., 329 N.E.2d 414. 
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construe “trade secrets” fairly narrowly.47  For example, in American 
Shippers Supply Co. v. Campbell,48 the court held that the former 
employer did not have a “protectible interest in [its] customer lists . . . [, 
since the] list[s] could have been easily obtained . . . [from a] telephone 
directory or trade publication, [and the] lists were . . . not regarded as 
confidential. . . .”49  Similarly, in Cudahy Co. v. American Labs., Inc.,50 
the court found that a former employee “had a wealth of knowledge and 
expertise in production and marketing . . . [in that business] and data on 
profits and costs of production would be common knowledge to anyone 
of his experience.”51  Thus, such knowledge did not constitute a 
[protectible] ‘trade secret.’52 
Protection for that which is truly secret and confidential is certainly 
justified.  Without such protection employers would be hesitant or 
unwilling to impart trade secrets to employees, which would seriously 
impede commercial growth and progress.53  A lack of protection could 
also result in inefficiency, as employers may try to reduce trade secret 
leakage by only allowing each employee to know part of the total 
process or information, thus making it impossible for anyone to take 
away the entire protected secret.54  Or, access might be denied to some 
employees even though they might well be able to use such access in 
their work to the employer’s advantage.55  Employees to whom secrets 
can be revealed can be given more important and more complex 
assignments and responsibilities, much to the benefit of the employer.56 
B. Inevitable Disclosure 
1. Factors Considered 
Employers usually try to protect themselves from disclosure or use 
of trade secrets by entering into a nondisclosure agreement before, 
                                                                                                                                 
 47. See Am. Shippers Supply Co. v. Campbell, 456 N.E.2d 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1044. 
 50. 313 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Neb. 1970). 
 51. Id. at 1343. 
 52. Id. 
 53. For a discussion on the matter, see generally Sela Stroud, Non-Compete Agreements: 
Weighing the Interests of Profession and Firm, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1023 (2002). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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during, or at the termination of the employment.57  Yet with or without 
such an agreement, and even if the former employee acts in the utmost 
good faith, there are situations where the employer will claim that, if the 
former employee is allowed to work for a competitor, it will inevitably 
be necessary for him to disclose or use his former employer’s trade 
secrets in order to properly perform his new job.58  Thus, in an 
“inevitable disclosure” case, a former employee may be prohibited from 
working for a competitor even though there was never a non-disclosure 
or noncompetition agreement and he never threatened to disclose or use 
trade secrets.59 
Among the factors which a court will consider in applying the 
inevitable disclosure theory are: (1) the extent of competition between 
the new and the former employers, (2) the efforts undertaken by the new 
employer to avoid disclosure of the trade secrets, (3) the similarity 
between the employee’s former and new positions, (4) the amount of 
exposure of the employee to the trade secrets, (6) the potential injury to 
the former employer and the advantage to be gained by the new 
employer, and (7) the availability from other sources of equally effective 
knowledge or technology that will be just as useful to the new employer 
as a competitor.60 
Where “inevitable disclosure” is found to exist, a court may issue 
an injunction prohibiting employment with the new employer, not just 
the possible disclosure of trade secrets.61  Several recent cases provide 
good examples.  In Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond,62 the employee’s “high 
level position . . . gave him access to inside information and trade 
secrets.”63  The employee had a confidentiality agreement with the 
employer as to confidential information.64  The court found that the 
                                                                                                                                 
 57. See supra note 2 (discussing the same). 
 58. A frequently cited “inevitable disclosure” case is B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 
N.E.2d 99 (Ohio App. 1963).  But, the theory was recognized at least as early as Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Power Film Products, Inc., 179 N.Y.S. 325 (App. Div. 1919) (noting that the employee 
cannot fulfill a non-disclosure promise to a former employer and also fulfill his obligations to his 
new employer). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Lawrence I. 
Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a Former Employee Who Never Signed 
a Non-Compete Agreement Nor Threatened to Use or Disclose Trade Secrets Be Prohibited From 
Working for a Competitor? 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 211, 216 (1997). 
 61. Some courts refuse to issue this injunction, reasoning that a “claim of trade secret 
misappropriation should not act as an ex post facto covenant not to compete.”  IBM v. Seagate 
Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) (citation omitted). 
 62. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 63. Id. at 1264. 
 64. Id. 
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employee’s knowledge of his employer’s pricing, marketing, and 
distribution system and plans would have value to his new employer in 
its planning and strategy in the near future, because the new employee 
could anticipate and counter the former employer’s “distribution, 
packaging, pricing, and marketing moves.”65  It was not enough that the 
employee had agreed “not to disclose any trade secrets or confidential 
information gleaned from his earlier employment.”66  It was inevitable 
that he would rely on his former employer’s trade secrets in his new 
job.67 
In Marcam Corp. v. Orchard,68 the court ruled that “harm to [the 
former employer] can not be avoided simply by [the former employee’s] 
intention not to disclose confidential information, or even by his 
scrupulous efforts to avoid disclosure.”69  The employee would go to the 
competitor with full knowledge of the former employer’s “products, its 
development strategies, its marketing plans, its customers and other 
significant business information which can[not] be set aside . . . . what 
he knows about [the former employer] is bound to influence what he 
does for [the competitor],” and that will disadvantage the former 
employer.70 
Similarly, in Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith,71 the employee was the 
“Worldwide Marketing Manager,” [with] wide ranging duties, . . . [and] 
involved in top level meetings and discussions on all matters within the 
company, and was highly regarded by his employer.”72  The court said 
that “it is inevitable that [the former employee] will disclose 
important . . . trade secrets and confidential information [of his former 
employer] in his efforts to improve [his new employer’s] product, and 
aid his new employer and his own future.”73  Despite assurances of the 
former employee and his new employer-to-be that they would not use 
trade secrets, and “‘even assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful 
whether the [former employee] could completely divorce his knowledge 
of the trade secrets from any . . . work he might engage in’ with [the new 
                                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 1270. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1271. 
 68. 885 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 69. Id. at 297. 
 70. Id.  The former employer had been developing a new product, and the employee had been 
involved in all aspects of the product.  Id. at 296. 
 71. 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 72. Id. at 625. 
 73. Id. at 631. 
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employer].”74 
2. Negative Aspects of “Inevitable Disclosure” 
There are strong arguments against applying the “inevitable 
disclosure” doctrine.75  First, it benefits employers who did not bargain 
for a noncompetition agreement.76  The employee will be bound by a 
court ordered restriction without having any opportunity to negotiate (or 
reject) its provisions.  The employer receives a benefit for which it did 
not pay.  Second, application of the doctrine interferes with the mobility 
of employees, and impedes and perhaps stifles the growth and 
development of competitors in the marketplace.77  It should also be 
noted that the decisions in these cases usually occur at the preliminary 
injunction stage based, not on any wrongful conduct of the employee or 
the employer-to-be, but rather on the former employer’s likelihood of 
success.  Unfortunately, that may be the end of the matter; if an 
                                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 636. 
 75. See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 898 (observing that contractual restraints placed upon 
employment are “looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully scrutinized”). 
 76. Jonathan O. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure: A Proposal To Balance 
Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 325, 345 n.8 (2000) stating: 
See Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 188, cmt. g (1981). This comment observes 
that courts closely scrutinize restraints upon employment because an employee is likely 
to agree to such a restriction without considering “the hardship he may later suffer 
through loss of his livelihood.” Courts have mirrored the Restatement in their treatment 
of covenants not to compete. For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Bennett, 
when considering a covenant not to compete, observed that courts are influenced by a 
“concern for the average individual employee who as a result of his unequal bargaining 
power may be found in oppressive circumstances.  While quoting Menter Co. v. Brock, 
180 N.W. 553, 555 (Minn. 1920), the Bennett court noted that a person who is in urgent 
need of employment is unlikely to object to the terms of a contract if the wages are 
reasonable. 
Id. (citations ommitted) (emphasis added); See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 899. 
 77. Harris, supra note 76, at 345 n.11 stating: 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1) (1981).  Even if the restraint is no greater 
than is needed to protect the promisee’s interest, the promisee’s need may be outweighed 
by the harm to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. In the case of a sale of a 
business, the harm caused to the seller may be excessive if the restraint necessitates his 
complete withdrawal from business; the likely injury to the public may be too great if it 
has the effect of removing a former competitor from competition. . . . In the case of a 
post-employment restraint, the harm caused to the employee may be excessive if the 
restraint inhibits his personal freedom by preventing him from earning his livelihood if 
he quits; the likely injury to the public may be too great if it is seriously harmed by the 
impairment of his economic mobility or by the unavailability of the skills developed in 
his employment. . . . Not every restraint causes injury to the public, however, and even a 
post-employment restraint may increase efficiency by encouraging the employer to 
entrust confidential information to the employee. 
Id. 
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injunction against accepting the new employment is granted, pending a 
trial on the merits, the former employer will effectively prevail if, as is 
common, the trial will not take place until some time in the (perhaps 
distant) future. 
3. Possible Solution 
Employers should be encouraged to make agreements concerning 
nondisclosure and noncompetition at the time employees are hired, not 
at the time of termination, or especially by a court order thereafter.78  
This can be accomplished by the threat that only a reasonable agreement 
made prior to the termination of employment will be enforced, unless the 
employee will receive new and fair consideration for the post-
employment restriction.79  In any case, an injunction should be granted 
only if it is clear that it is essentially impossible for the former employee 
to perform the duties of his new job without the use or disclosure of 
                                                                                                                                 
 78. See Hal Lancaster, How to Loosen Grip of a Noncompete Pact After Your Breakup, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 17, 1998, at B1, asserting that “[t]he best time to negotiate [a noncompete agreement] is 
during the courtship, ‘when everyone is happy and begging you to come over. . . .’” (quoting Alan 
Sklover, a New York attorney who specializes in executive compensation and severance 
negotiations). 
 79. Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 809, n.16 (1999), quoting JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, TRADE SECRETS 
PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION, 8 (1998) as stating: 
The decision of the drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts not to include trade 
secrets corresponded with the growing efforts of another legal reform movement that 
sought to codify various areas of law by means of uniform acts designed to be adopted 
by individual states. 
Id.  See JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION 
168 (1998) (stating that it is generally easy to find adequate consideration to support an employee’s 
non-compete agreement when the agreement was entered into at the beginning of the employment 
relationship).  See also Lancaster, supra note 77, at B1 (stating that sometimes employees are 
unaware that they have signed a noncompete agreement and that employees should seek 
consideration for signing a noncompete agreement at the beginning of the employment relationship, 
during the “courtship,” because this is the best time to negotiate).  Courts will look more favorably 
on a non-compete agreement that clearly compensates the employee for signing it.  See Suellen 
Lowry, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions Of Concurrent Property 
Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519, 532 (1988).  Some urge that employees should be given additional 
consideration for signing a non-compete agreement such as compensation equivalent to the lost 
wages during the time the employee agrees not to compete.  See, e.g., Lumex, 919 F. Supp. at 636 
(enforcing a non-compete clause because it contains “fair and reasonable counterbalancing 
provisions,” including allowing work for a competitor, but preventing work on competitive 
products, specifying a relatively short time [six months] of non-competition, and payment by the 
former employer of the employee’s salary and benefits during the period of non-competition).  Or, 
the employer could offer another form of consideration.  See Garry Mathiason, What’s In Your 
Head Can Hurt You, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 153.  The employer, at the time of hiring or later, 
could ask the employee to give the company the right to hire the employee as a consultant for a 
short period of time if he resigns or is terminated.  Id. 
14
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trade secrets.80  It should also be clear that the former employer will 
suffer irreparable damage which is not compensable in damages.81  As 
with any restrictive convenant, new and adequate consideration should 
be required.  Where possible, the court’s restriction should not totally 
                                                                                                                                 
 80. Whaley, supra note 79 (proposing a new remedy be used for unavoidable disclosures).  
Whaley states that: 
If a court examines these five factors and determines that all five are satisfied, namely 
that (1) the two employers are fierce competitors who are producing the same or similar 
products, (2) the trade secret information is critical to success in the marketplace, (3) the 
two positions are very similar in the hierarchy of the companies and would require the 
employee to do many of the same tasks or make similar strategic decisions, (4) the 
employee truly does have the trade secret information in her head-she either has so much 
information that all of it together would harm her former employer or she has knowledge 
of a key piece of information, and (5) the employee has other options and could in fact 
use his or her skills and not use the trade secrets elsewhere in the marketplace, the court 
should find “unavoidable disclosure.”  The court should not consider the good or bad 
faith of the employer or employee under this standard.  If it is really inevitable that an 
employee will have to rely on the same information, the intention or good or bad faith of 
the employee is not relevant. Under the “unavoidable disclosure” standard, inevitable 
truly means inevitable.  Irrespective of intention, an employee will not be able to help 
but use the information that is in his of her head and that is a trade secret of the former 
employer.  If the court is convinced from the above five factors alone that irrespective of 
an employee’s good or bad faith, disclosure of the secret will occur, the court should find 
that there is “unavoidable disclosure.” 
  If all of these factors are met, the court may enjoin the employee from working for 
the competitor until the information is no longer valuable.  A non-compete injunction is 
the only sufficient remedy for a finding of unavoidable disclosure.  A nondisclosure 
injunction for this situation would be meaningless because if disclosure is truly 
unavoidable, by definition, the employee will be unable to comply with the 
nondisclosure injunction.  However, because the disclosure of the information is 
unavoidable, and because this is a situation in which blame can not be placed on any 
party, a unique compensatory non-compete injunction should be issued.  Both the former 
employer and the new employer will be ordered to share the costs of compensation for 
the employee who will not be allowed to work.  The employee is restricted from 
working, but he or she at least will be compensated during that time period.  This will be 
a rigid and tough standard to satisfy, but it is conceivable that there are rare times when 
disclosure really is unavoidable. 
  This standard allows for a continuation of the same level of trade secret protection.  
When it is truly inevitable that an employee can not help but rely on the information, the 
secrecy and value of that information will be safeguarded because an injunction will 
issue preventing the employee from working for the competitor. 
Id. 
 81. See also Adam Dowd, Note, Contract Law: Restrictive Covenants Lacking Territorial 
Limits Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W. 2d 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), 21 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 301, 307 (1995); Lomex, 919 F. Supp. at 627; Whaley, supra note 79, at 848 stating: 
The Competitiveness of the Former and Future Employer: Are the two companies truly 
competitors? They must be rival companies who are producing the same or very similar 
products or services such that the confidential information an employee has will benefit 
the second employer. Also, as a part of this factor, courts must examine the type of 
industry in which the companies are competing. 
Id. 
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bar employment in any capacity with the new employer, but should 
apply only to jobs in which the former employer’s trade secrets would be 
useful.82  Finally, the duration of the injunction should be limited to the 
time during which the information will continue to have value.83 
If disclosure is truly inevitable and unavoidable, the former 
employee is unable to comply with a nondisclosure agreement or court 
order.84  Only a noncompetition order will protect the former employer.85  
But the latter should pay for that benefit.  In Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith,86 
the covenant restricted the employee from working in any part of a 
competitor’s business which competed with the former employer for six 
months.  If the employee was unable to find comparable work due to the 
restriction, the former employer would pay his salary and benefits for six 
months.87  This court found this covenant to be fair and reasonable.88  He 
could “work for a competitor, but not on a ‘competitive product.’”89  He 
would “be fully compensated for the six month period,”90 after which he 
would be free to fully and directly compete. 
Similarly, in Marcam Corp. v. Orchard,91 the noncompetition 
                                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. stating: 
The employee’s former and current or proposed future positions must be the same or 
very similar. The employee[‘s] new position should be an almost identical job, with the 
same responsibilities and tasks, such that it would be impossible for the employee not to 
utilize the information she was privy to at her previous place of employment. If the new 
position would be with a competitor but in a totally different job role or in another 
division, the court should not conclude a finding of “unavoidable disclosure.” 
Id.  Also, the court should consider the amount of discretion involved in each position.  See Victoria 
A. Cundiff, Hiring Competitors’ Employees: A Trade Secrets Perspective: Simple Rules of Thumb 
Can Be Misleading, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, at S2.  How much discretion will the employee have 
in the new position?  An employee who is truly being hired simply to implement a pre-existing plan 
that cannot be readily changed may be unable to do much damage.  Id.  An employee who is 
actually going to be developing a competitor’s strategic or product plan may be far more dangerous.  
Id.  For example, a court should not grant an injunction on the basis of unavoidable disclosure when 
an employee leaves a position in strategic planning to work in a divisional sales office with a 
dissimilar and unrelated job description. 
 83. See Chiara F. Orsini, Comment, Protecting An Employer’s Human Capital: Covenants 
Not To Compete and The Changing Business Environment,  62 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 183 (2000) 
(noting one courts’ refusal to enjoin a defendant for more than six months because the information 
would have lost its value).  Covenants not to compete are required to fulfill a reasonableness 
standard in respect to both temporal and geographic limitations.  See also infra note 94. 
 84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 87. Id. at 626. 
 88. Id. at 636. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 885 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1995). 
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agreement was for one year anywhere in the United States; the employer 
offered to pay the employee 110% of the salary offered by a competitor 
during that year; the employee would then not disclose information 
about the employer’s business.92  The court found this to be reasonable, 
as the former employee could work for the proposed new employer in its 
London office for one year, and anywhere thereafter, or he could work 
for a non-competitor of the former employer anywhere.93  If no other 
employment opportunities worked out, he would be fairly compensated 
for a year. 
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS 
A. Statutory Provisions 
The courts in most states will enforce a noncompetition agreement 
which the court finds to be reasonable.94  In some states this 
enforceability is expressly stated in a statute.  For example, a Michigan 
statute declares: 
An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant 
which protects an employer’s reasonable competitive business interests 
and expressly prohibits an employee from engaging in employment or 
a line of business after termination of employment if the agreement or 
covenant is reasonable as to its duration, geographical area, and the 
type of employment or line of business.95 
Some statutes also expressly point out that a court should not “enter 
an injunction contrary to the public health, safety, or welfare or in any 
case where the injunction enforces an unreasonable covenant not to 
compete or where there is no showing of irreparable injury” to the 
former employer.96  Also, some statutes, while authorizing the use of 
convenants not to compete, limit their duration to a maximum time, such 
as two years.97 
                                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 296. 
 93. Id. at 298. 
 94. Lumex, 919 F. Supp. at 628 (noting that “[i]t is well established that restrictive covenants 
. . . will be enforced only if reasonably limited in scope and duration, and then only to the extent 
necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition”). 
 95. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a(1) (2001).  See also WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2001) (stating 
any covenant imposing an unreasonable restraint is unenforceable); TEX. BUS. & COM. ANN. § 
15.50 (2001) (stating an agreement must not impose greater restraints than necessary to protect the 
goodwill or other business interests of the employer). 
 96. FLA. STAT. ch. 542.33(2)(a) (2001). 
 97. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921C (2001) (stating that an “employee may 
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Some state statutes, on the other hand, expressly prohibit 
noncompetition agreements.98  For example, the North Dakota statute 
provides that “[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from 
exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that 
extent void,” except when the restraint is in connection with the sale of a 
business on the dissolution of a partnership.99 
Some statutes are more permissive as to the post-employment 
activities of the former employee.100  For example, in Oklahoma the 
former employee “shall be permitted to engage in the same [or a similar] 
business as that conducted by the former employer . . . as long as the 
former employee does not directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a 
combination [thereof] from the established customers of the former 
employer.”101 
Even those states which generally prohibit post-employment 
noncompetition agreements do allow and enforce agreements for the 
non-disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information.  However, 
the statutes in some states have been construed to deny the employer 
even that protection.  For example, in State Medical Oxygen and Supply, 
Inc. v. American Medical Oxygen Co.,102 the employees had agreed not 
to disclose trade secrets or customer lists “for all time.”  The Montana 
statute103 provided that “‘[a]ny contract by which anyone is restrained 
from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, 
otherwise than [an agreement] . . . that upon either the sale of goodwill 
of a business or the dissolution of a partnership, one or more of the 
parties will refrain from carrying on a similar business . . . is to that 
extent void.’”104 
The court held that the statute was not limited to noncompetition 
agreements in employment contracts.105  It applied to any contractual 
                                                                                                                                 
agree . . . [to a restrictive covenant] not to exceed a period of two years from termination of 
employment”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2001) (stating that an “employee may agree not to 
engage . . . in same business . . . and not to solicit an employer’s existing customers within a 
specified area for any period not exceeding two years from the termination of agreement”). 
 98. See infra note 99. 
 99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2001).  See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (stating 
that “[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void”). 
 100. See infra note 101. 
 101. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219A (2001). 
 102. 782 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1989). 
 103. Id. at 1274. 
 104. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 as it existed at the time of the case). 
 105. Id. at 1275-76. 
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restraint.106  So, the agreement not to disclose violated the statute, and 
was therefore unenforceable.107 
B. Reasonableness 
1. Factors To Consider 
In determining the validity of a noncompetition agreement, courts 
will often apply criteria like the following: 
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in 
the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the employer 
in some legitimate business interest? 
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in 
the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his 
legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood? 
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public 
policy? 
Non-competition covenants which pass these tests in the light of the 
facts of each case will be enforced in equity.108 
a. Needs of the Employer 
i. Geographic Scope 
It is generally held that “[a]n employer is permitted to include 
in . . . a covenant [not to compete] the territory in which the employee 
has in fact performed work, thus protecting itself from the unfair 
appropriation of good will and information acquired in the course of that 
work.”109  Generally speaking, the area covered by a restraint will be 
considered reasonable if it is limited to the territory in which the 
employee was able, during his employment, to establish contact with his 
                                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 1272. 
 107. Id. at 1272. 
 108. Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Va. 1989). 
 109. Sysco Food Serv. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Chupp, 484 S.E.2d 323, 325 (Ga. App. 1997) 
(citations omitted) (enforcing covenant prohibiting sales manager from soliciting business in 11 
named counties where manager had actually worked). 
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employer’s customers.110 
Where there is a demonstrated need for broad geographic protection 
of the employer, it will be allowed and enforced.111  Thus, in 
Instrumentalist Co. v. Band, Inc.,112 a two year restraint throughout the 
United States was upheld.  The employer published a magazine directed 
to school band and orchestra directors and music teachers.  The 
employee was restrained only from working for a periodical in the same 
market.  The court found that the former employee had exercised near-
exclusive authority for contacting and servicing the 40 to 50 major 
advertisers, who were located throughout the United States, and he had 
close business and personal ties to the people who made advertising 
decisions at these firms.113 
Even where the restrictive covenant contained no express 
geographic limitation, a court held it to be enforceable where its 
parameters were narrowly delineated, prohibiting only post-employment 
contact with the employer’s customers whom the employee had 
contacted during his employment.114 
It is generally held that a contractual prohibition against doing 
business with any customer of the former employer, regardless of the 
employee’s relationship with that customer, is overbroad and 
unenforceable.115  Thus, in Mantek Division of NCH Corp. v. Share 
                                                                                                                                 
 110. Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 119 S.E.2d 533 (S.C. 1961).  See also Midwest 
Television, Inc. v. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (restraining a radio disk jockey for 
one year within 100 miles of employer’s station, which had a range of 60 to 90 miles; thus, a 
competitor with a strong signal within 100 miles could reach most of employer’s audience); 4408, 
Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (finding restriction applied only in areas of 
employee’s employment with employer); Paramount Termite Control, 380 S.E.2d at 922 (finding a 
restriction reasonable when applied only to counties where employees had worked in past two 
years). 
 111. Standard Register, 119 S.E.2d at 539.  “The general rule is that restraint as to territory, in 
order to be reasonable, must be necessary in its full extent for the protection of some legititmate 
interest of the employer.  Stated negatively, the territorial scope renders the restraint unreasonable if 
it covers as area broader than necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the employer.”  Id. 
 112. 480 N.E.2d 1273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
 113. Id. at 1281.  See also Nat’l Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Wright, 2 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 (E.D. Pa. 
1998) (finding an employee responsible for an employer’s product being shown on Internet, which 
had nationwide scope, and knew potential customers throughout country). 
 114. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529 (Ga. 1992).  See also Am. Software USA v. 
Moore, 448 S.E.2d 206, 209 (Ga. 1994) (finding a proscription of a post-employment competitive 
activity with any of employer’s licensees anywhere in United States, regardless of whether 
employee had ever had contact with them during his employment, was unreasonable). 
 115. AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. T-Bo Propane, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ga. 1997).  See 
also Frederick v. Prof’l Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc., 344 N.E.2d 299, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) 
(voiding a covenant where a restriction applied to 8 counties in the region where the employee had 
worked in only 2 of them); Welcome Wagon Int’l, Inc. v. Hostesses, Inc., 255 N.W.2d 865, 865-66 
(Neb. 1977) (finding a covenant too broad where an employee had worked for employer only in one 
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Corp.,116 while the restriction was only against competing within the 
three salesmen’s former territories, the court found that their territories 
were extensive, and that the market for their employer’s chemical 
products included almost every business and municipality.117  The 
restriction would prevent the employees from contacting potential new 
customers in their old territories who had not been contacted while they 
were employed by the former employer.118  The court said an injunction 
could only apply to calling on customers contacted while working for 
the former employer, and potential customers from whom they actually 
solicited business while with the former employer, because the latter had 
no good will as to other potential customers.119 
Courts will enforce a restriction applying to the employer’s entire 
business territory, even areas where the employee has not worked, where 
it is shown that the employee had access to business information, data, 
technical developments, and other restricted information, since his 
knowledge of the employer’s business could be effectively used to the 
employer’s detriment throughout the territory of the employer’s 
business.120 
ii. Duration in Time 
As is the case with other restraints on post-employment competition, 
three factors will usually be looked to when determining whether a time 
limit is reasonable.121  First, the duration of the restriction must be no 
                                                                                                                                 
small city and the restriction barred her from competing anywhere in the United States where the 
employer operated). 
 116. 780 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 117. Id. at 709. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 710. 
 120. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Mills, 127 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 1962).  See also All Stainless, 
Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481 (Mass. 1974) (finding a restriction unreasonable where it included 
areas outside the salesman’s former territory and where he had no confidential knowledge or 
information). 
 121. Standard Register Co. v. Cleaver, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (discussing 
how “reasonableness of time restraint in covenant not to compete is generally judged using three 
criteria: its relation to employer’s protectable interest, possible injury to employee by precluding 
[employee] from pursuing his occupation as a means of support, and whether it will interfere with 
interests of the general public by depriving it of the restricted party’s services”); Standard Forms 
Co. v. Nave, 422 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (stating in determining whether 
noncompetitive covenant is reasonable as to time and space, courts may consider “the threatened 
danger to the employer in absence of such an agreement, the economic hardship imposed on the 
employee, and the public interest”); John W. Bowers et al., Covenants Not to Compete: Their Use 
and Enforcement in Indiana, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 65, 78 (1996) (discussing how “the reasonableness 
of a time restraint is generally judged using three criteria: the length of the restraint must relate to 
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longer than is necessary to protect the interest of the employer.122  Thus, 
in Frederick v. Professional Building Maintenance Industries, Inc.,123 a 
restriction for ten years for any building maintenance work in eight 
counties, where the former employee had worked in only two of the 
counties, was held to be too broad in time and geography.124  Any 
pricing information and customer good will that the employee had would 
have value for only a short time.125 
Second, the duration of the restriction must not unduly harm the 
employee by making it difficult or impossible for him to work in his 
chosen field and support himself and his family.126  Where the restriction 
may have the effect of making the employee unemployable during its 
duration, the covenant can include provisions to compensate the 
employee during any forced period of inactivity.127  Thus, in Lumex, Inc. 
                                                                                                                                 
the employer’s protectable interest, . . . the restraint must not be so long in time as to injure the 
employee, . . . and the restraint must not be so long in time as to interfere with the interests of the 
general public”). 
 122. Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating the length of a time 
restriction contained in a noncompetition agreement must be reasonably related to the needs of the 
employer’s business); Kramer v. Robec, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 508, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (stating that a 
covenant not to compete which barred a computer company employee from working for a 
competitor for three years was unreasonable in scope because the three-year period was not 
necessary to protect the interest in technology which would become obsolete in 12 to 18 months); 
Electrical Distributors, Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that time 
restraints “in covenants not to compete must be necessary in [their] full extent for the protection of 
some legitimate interest of the promisee”). 
 123. 344 N.E.2d 299 (1976). 
 124. Paramount, 380 S.E. 2d at 925 (concluding that the restraint prohibiting former 
employees from competing was reasonable because it was no greater than reasonably necessary to 
protect the former employers legitimate business interest in the counties in which the employees 
worked); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that a 
manufacturer’s three-year non-compete covenant with a sales representative was reasonable and 
enforceable because the manufacturer had made extensive efforts to develop its customer database).  
Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Dale, 170 F. Supp. 2d 892, 895 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding a five-year 
term non-comptetion agreement was not reasonable as drafted because such a long term failed to 
serve legitimate business needs of former employer). 
 125. Frederick, 344 N.E.2d at 301-02. 
 126. Electrical Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating a restraint as to time 
contained in a covenant not to compete must not be unduly harsh and oppressive to the covenantor); 
Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hydro Techs., Inc., 984 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating a covenant not 
to compete for two years in the same or similar business as an employer’s was unenforceable 
because it effectively barred former employees from working in water treatment industry).  But see 
First Health Group Corp. v. Nat’l Prescription Adms., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 194, 230-31 (M.D. Pa. 
2001) (stating that a covenant not to compete which prohibited customer solicitation with a state 
prescription drug plan contractor was reasonable). 
 127. Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(discussing a covenant not to compete that precluded a former employee from engaging in any 
competition against a business consulting firm in 48 contiguous states and Canada for period of 
three years was enforceable, as long as the firm continued to pay him half of his $200,000 salary 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss1/2
INGRAM1.DOC 1/6/03  2:46 PM 
2002] COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 71 
v. Highsmith,128 the noncompetition agreement was for six months as to 
any part of a competitor’s business which competed with the employer.  
The agreement provided that if the employee could not find appropriate 
work due to this restriction, the employer would pay his salary and 
benefits for six months.129  The court held that six months was a 
relatively short time and necessary to protect the employer, since the 
employee was privy to “important . . . trade secrets and confidential 
information. . . .”130  The restriction was not unduly burdensome on the 
employee, as he could “work for a competitor, but not on a ‘competitive 
product,’”131 or for any noncompetitor.  If necessary, he would “be fully 
compensated during the six month period.”132  The court also noted that 
the employee “himself conceded that [the potential new employer was 
likely to still] employ [him] after the six-month period.”133 
Finally, the public interest must be considered.134  Public policy 
favors making available as many services as possible.  If the restriction 
will deprive the public of desirable services for too long, it will be held 
to be unreasonable.135 
iii. Kind of Activity 
A noncompetition agreement should bar the former employee only 
from engaging in work or business activities that are the same as or 
similar to those of his employment with the former employer.136  The 
                                                                                                                                 
plus health benefits and repurchased his nearly $1 million in stock). 
 128. 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 129. Id. at 626. 
 130. Id. at 631. 
 131. Id. at 636. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Standard Register, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (stating the last factor to consider in 
determining if a time restraint is reasonable is whether it will interfere with the interests of the 
general public by depriving it of the restricted party’s services); Standard Forms, 422 F. Supp. at 
623 (stating that in determining whether a noncompetitive covenant is reasonable as to time and 
space, courts must consider the threatened danger to the public); Bowers, supra note 121, at 78 
(discussing how the reasonableness of a time restraint is generally judged using three criteria: the 
length of the restraint must relate to the employer’s protectable interest, restraint must not be so long 
in time as to injure the employee, and the restraint must not be so long in time as to interfere with 
the interests of the general public); Orsini, supra note 83 at 176 (stating that when courts review the 
reasonableness of a covenant not to compete, the harmful results to the public are considered); 
Pierre H. Bergeron, Navigating the “Deep” and “Unsettled Sea” of Covenant Not to Compete 
Litigation in Ohio: A Comprehensive Look, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 373, 380-81 (2000) (discussing how 
courts have determined covenants not to compete in certain professions are disfavored because of 
how injurious they are to the public). 
 135. Bowers, supra note 121, at 78. 
 136. Padco Advisors, Inc. v. Omdahl, 179 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607-08 (D. Md. 2002) (stating that 
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restriction should be limited to activities which will put the former 
employer at a competitive disadvantage because of the employee’s 
usurpation of good will or use of trade secrets.  For example, in 
Paramount Termite Control Co., Inc. v. Rector,137 the court upheld a 
restriction barring the employees from engaging in the pest control 
business.  The court pointed out that the employees could engage in any 
other work anywhere, and could even engage in the pest control business 
except in the territory where they had worked in the previous two 
years.138 
Similarly, in Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson,139 the restrictive 
covenant barred a popular radio disk jockey from employment as a disk 
jockey for one year within the employer’s listening area.  The court 
noted that the employee was only barred “from performing the same job 
functions at a competing local station . . . [, which left] open . . . a wide 
range of positions . . . within the restricted . . . area.”140 
b. Burden on the Employee 
A restrictive covenant must not be unduly burdensome on the 
employee by making it difficult or impossible for him to work in any 
appropriate new job.141  In Schlumberger Well Service v. Blaker,142 the 
court denied enforcement of a covenant barring an executive of an oil 
and gas company, for two years, from employment with any competitor 
                                                                                                                                 
a covenant not to compete was not overbroad because it only precluded an employee from 
becoming employed by either one of the two competitors offering the same specialized mutual 
funds as those available from the company); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 
667, 684-85 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (discussing how a noncompetition covenant that prohibited an 
employee from working for any business that sold commercial roofing products was unenforceable 
because the covenant restricted the employee from working for any employer who sold products 
that competed with the former employer even if the employee’s new employment did not relate to 
the roofing aspect of the new employer’s business); Superior Consulting Co., Inc. v. Walling, 851 F. 
Supp. 839, 847 (E.D. Mich 1994) (stating that a covenant not to compete was too broad to be 
enforceable where the covenant prohibited an employee from working in any capacity for a 
competitor of the former employer). 
 137. 380 S.E.2d 922 (Va. 1989). 
 138. Id. at 925. 
 139. 699 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 140. Id. at 235. 
 141. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Francavilla, 191 F. Supp. 2d 270, 279 (D. Conn. 2002) 
(stating under Connecticut law, one of the five factors to be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is the extent it restrains an employee’s opportunity to 
pursue his occupation); Roto-Die Co., Inc v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (W.D. Va. 1995) 
(stating that a restrictive covenant which prohibited an employee from being an employee of any 
competitive business was overbroad in scope because the provision would have prevented the 
employee “from working in any capacity, including that of a janitor, for a competitive business”). 
 142. 623 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D. Ind. 1985). 
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of employer “in substantially every oil and gas producing area in . . . the 
United States and Canada. . . .”143  The court found that enforcing this 
restriction would “be potentially devastating to both [the employee] and 
his family.”144 
Most carefully and thoughtfully drawn restrictive covenants will be 
found to not unduly burden the employee.145  For example in Millard 
Maintenance Service Co. v. Bernero,146 a two year noncompetition 
agreement in three counties was found to impose no unreasonable 
burden on the employee.  He could compete with his former employer 
except for the latter’s existing customers, and could also engage in the 
same business anywhere else. 
Similarly, in Wessel Co., Inc. v. Busa,147 the court enforced a 
restriction barring the employee, for three years, from soliciting or 
serving anyone with whom the employer had done or sought to do 
business in the past two years in the territory in which the employee had 
worked.  The court pointed out the employee could work in a 
competitive business in the same area, but could not solicit 50-60 firms 
in that area.  There were still 3-400 potential customers in the restricted 
area, all of whom he could solicit, as well as the rest of the world.148 
Another court pointed out the distinction to be made between those 
employees whose training, skills, and experience might have value only 
in a fairly narrow business field, as opposed to those with broader talents 
which could lead to employment with many other firms which would not 
be competitors of the employer.149  The court said that it would not 
assume that compliance with a restrictive covenant would result in 
unreasonable hardship on high-level business executives whose talents 
                                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 1313. 
 144. Id. at 1318.  Though it denied an injunction against his new employment, the court did 
grant an injunction as to information which the court deemed to be trade secrets.  Id. 
 145. See Millard Maint., 566 N.E.2d at 384 (stating that post employment covenants not to 
compete will be enforced if their terms are reasonable); Union Nat’l. Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 143 F. 
Supp. 2d 638, 643 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (suggesting the determination of whether a “covenant not to 
compete is valid and enforceable is largely predicated upon the reasonableness and specificity of its 
terms” when it is drafted); J.E. Hanger, Inc. v. Scussel, 937 F. Supp. 1546, 1554 (M.D. Ala. 1996) 
(allowing, as not overbroad, the enforcement of a covenant which prohibited a former employee 
from soliciting any of the employer’s customers with whom the former employee had any business 
dealings on behalf of the employer within the two years prior to his termination). 
 146. 566 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 147. 329 N.E.2d 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
 148. Id. at 418 (suggesting restrictive covenants that are only limited to former employer’s 
customers are not unduly burdensome because an employee can still solicit business in a restricted 
area from potential customers that a former employee did not do business with, as well as, 
customers outside the restrictive area). 
 149. Universal Elec. Corp. v. Golden Shield Corp., 316 F.2d 568 (1st Cir. 1963). 
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could be useful in many other, non-competitive, lines of business.150  
The same may well be true for many others, such as those in sales and 
marketing, computer analysts and consultants, and so on. 
c. Public Interest and Need 
As I have noted supra,151 one of the reasons courts have 
traditionally disfavored restrictive covenants is that public policy 
encourages the broadest possible availability of services.  Many courts 
will deny enforcement if the restraint will deprive the public of needed 
or desirable services.152 
2. Won’t Be Enforced At All If Unreasonable 
As the court pointed out in Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced 
Vacuum Components, Inc.,153 when courts are faced with a restrictive 
covenant which contains unreasonable and therefore unenforceable 
provisions, there are three possible approaches: 
(1) the “all or nothing” approach, which would void the restrictive 
covenant entirely if any part is unenforceable, 
(2) the “blue pencil” approach, which enables the court to enforce the 
reasonable terms provided the covenant remains grammatically 
coherent once its unreasonable provisions are excised, and 
(3) the “partial enforcement” approach, which reforms and enforces the 
restrictive covenant to the extent it is reasonable, unless the 
“circumstances indicate bad faith or deliberate overreaching” on the 
part of the employer.154 
                                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 572. 
 151. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 152. Liautaud, 221 F.3d at 987 (stating that the terms of restrictive covenant must not be 
injurious to the general public); W. Med. Consultants, Inc. v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 
1996) (stating that a covenant not to compete must not be so large in its operation as to interfere 
with public interests).  Covenants not to compete would interfere with the public interests if they 
prohibited an employee from competing with her former employer by establishing a competing 
office in an area long before the former employer contemplated opening an office in that area.  Id. 
See also Bus. Records Corp. v. Lueth, 981 F.2d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that before a court 
will enforce a covenant not to compete, the proponent of the covenant must show that the 
enforcement of the covenant would not be injurious to the interests of the general public). 
 153. 968 F.2d 1463 (1st Cir. 1992).  See also Data Mgmt. Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64-65 
(Alaska 1998) (discussing the three approaches used by courts to deal with a covenant not to 
compete which is overbroad and unreasonable). 
 154. Ferrofluidics, 968 F.2d at 1469 (citation omitted). 
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Many states will not enforce any part of a restrictive covenant if it 
finds that the covenant is unreasonable in any respect.155  Sometimes this 
rule is established by legislation,156 but more commonly the rule is 
established by the judiciary.157  The rationale supporting this rule is to 
prevent overreaching by employers.158  In these states employers know 
that, if they try to get too much, they may get nothing.  “[W]hen a 
restriction . . . is too far reaching to be valid, the court will not make a 
new contract for the parties by reducing the restriction to a shorter time 
or to a smaller area.”159  Those who oppose this “all or nothing” 
                                                                                                                                 
 155. Brockley v. Lozier Corp., 488 N.W.2d 556, 563-64 (Neb. 1992) (stating that under 
Nebraska law if a covenant not to compete is not reasonable then the covenant is not enforceable); 
Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assoc., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 917 (N.C. App. 1994) (stating if one of the 
requirements necessary for a covenant not to compete to be reasonable is not met “the entire 
covenant fails since equity will neither enforce nor reform an overreaching and unreasonable 
covenant”); Wolff v. Protégé Sys., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 429, 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (stating “[a] 
restrictive covenant must stand or fall in its entirety; if a contract contains illegal and unenforceable 
clauses within a restrictive covenant, the entire covenant must fail because the [Georgia] Supreme 
Court has refused to apply the blue-pencil theory of severability”); Russell Daniel Irrigation Co., 
Ltd. v. Coram, 516 S.E.2d 804, 806-07 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (stating blue-penciling is not available 
to re-write defective employment restrictive covenants); Varsity Gold, Inc. v. Porzio, 45 P.3d 352 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (stating a court could not reform a covenant not to compete to limit its 
geographical scope, although an employment agreement provided for such reformation; a court only 
has the authority to eliminate grammatically severable and unreasonable terms); Laurence H. Reece, 
III, Employee Noncompetition Agreements: Four Recurring Issues, 46 B. B.J. 10, 10 (2002) (stating 
that Massachusetts courts have not adopted the “blue pencil” approach to strike overly broad 
noncompetition provisions); Ellen R. Lokker et al., Ninth Circuit Panel Holds Arbitrator Clause 
Unconscionable, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 164, 172 (2002) (stating Georgia refuses to employ the “blue 
pencil” doctrine in which an unenforceable covenant could be excised from the agreement). 
 156. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2001). 
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his or her employer or 
principal during the term of the employment or agency, or after the termination of that 
employment or agency, within a specified territory and during a specified time is lawful 
and enforceable only if the restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the employer or principal.  Any covenant, described in this subsection, 
imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part 
of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint. 
Id. 
 157. See supra note 154 and accompanying case comments. 
 158. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (stating that with the 
blue pencil rule “employers may create ominous covenants, knowing that if employees contest the 
provisions, courts will modify the agreement to make it enforceable”); Kolani v. Gluska, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 257, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (suggesting “[e]mployers could insert broad, facially illegal 
covenants not to compete in their employment contracts [knowing] . . . most employees would 
honor these clauses without consulting counsel or challenging the clause in court”).  If employers 
know the law permits them to retreat to a narrow, lawful construction of the covenant not to 
compete it creates an incentive for employers to use the broad, illegal clauses.  Id. 
 159. Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 64, quoting Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 
1, 4 (Ark. 1973); Hartman, 450 S.E.2d at 917 (stating if one of the requirements necessary for a 
covenant not to compete to be reasonable is not met the entire covenant fails since equity will not 
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approach reason that the parties contracted for a covenant not to 
compete, and to void totally “all overbroad covenants not to compete . . . 
is too mechanistic and may produce unduly harsh results.”160 
3. Court May Use Its “Blue Pencil”161 
Some courts hold “that if words in an overbroad covenant not to 
compete can be deleted in such a way as to render it enforceable then the 
court may do so.  This is the so-called ‘blue pencil’ rule.”162  “[I]f the 
covenant is clearly separated into parts and some parts are reasonable 
and others are not, the contract may be held divisible.  The reasonable 
restrictions may then be enforced.”163  ‘Blue penciling’ should be limited 
                                                                                                                                 
reform an overreaching and unreasonable covenant). 
 160. Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 64 (stating “[o]bliterating all overbroad covenants not to 
compete, regardless of their factual settings, is too mechanistic and may produce unduly harsh 
results”).  “One of the elements of that bargain is the covenant not to compete, [and] [a]s a general 
rule, courts should respect the rights of parties to enter into contracts, and should not interfere with 
their contractual relationships.”  Id. 
 161. Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 83-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stating if the covenant 
is clearly separated into parts and some parts are reasonable and others are not, the contract may be 
held divisible and the reasonable restrictions may be enforced).  In such cases, unreasonable 
provisions are removed and the reasonable provisions are enforced under the blue pencil process.  
Id.  However, blue penciling must be restricted by applying terms which already clearly existed in 
the contract.  Id.  Henderson Implement Co., Inc. v. Langley, 707 So. 2d 482, 485-86 (La. Ct. App. 
1998) (stating courts “[can interpret] the will of the parties and decide that a provision inserted in 
the agreement is only an accessory clause to which the agreement was not subject for its 
existence”).  In these cases the unreasonable provision is deleted and the remainder of the 
agreement stands and is enforceable.  Id.  Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Valenti, 196 F. Supp. 2d 
269 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating under New York law, the geographic scope of covenant not to 
compete was unreasonable but could be corrected using blue pencil method without rendering the 
entire covenant unenforceable).  Gerald T. Husch & John Kluksdal, Employers’ Attorneys Must Be 
Careful When Drafting Covenants Not to Compete, 44 ADVOCATE 17, 18 (2001) (stating the Idaho 
Supreme Court has in principle adopted a flexible blue pencil approach in enforcing noncompetition 
covenants); See CHERIE BLACKBURN, SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR 
SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYERS, IV-20 (1999) (discussing South Carolina’s Blue Pencil Rule that 
allows a court to mark through the invalid portions of a restrictive covenant and enforce the 
remaining valid provisions of the covenant). 
 162. See supra note 160.  The rule derives its name from the action of the court to “strik[e], or 
‘pencil [ ] out,’ void, offensive or unreasonable language in a contract. . . .”  Bowers, supra note 
121, at 79.  Many courts have expressly rejected the “blue pencil” rule, for the reasons stated supra 
in Part IV.B.2.  See, e.g., Uni-Worth Enters., Inc. v. Wilson, 261 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1979). 
 163. Licocci v. Cardinal Assoc., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983) (citing Welcome 
Wagon, Inc. v. Haschert, 127 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1955); The Restatement of Contracts § 503 
states: 
That where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade in a bargain has added to it a 
promise in unreasonable restraint, the former promise is enforceable unless the entire 
agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise 
indivisible in terms would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise is illegal and is 
not enforceable even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint. 
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to enforcing provisions which “already clearly exist in the contract;” 
there should be no addition of provisions that were not already in the 
contract.164 
Some noncompetition agreements contain an express severability 
clause, which often leads a court to state that its existence “strengthens 
the case for the severance of unenforceable provisions because it 
indicates that the parties intended for the lawful portions of the contract 
to be enforced in the absence of the unlawful portions.”165 
4. Modify the Agreement 
One other approach, where some provisions in a noncompetition 
agreement are held to be overbroad and therefore unreasonable, if for the 
court to modify or alter the covenant to make it reasonable and 
enforceable, unless the court decides that the covenant was not drafted in 
good faith.166  These courts put the burden of proving good faith on the 
employer.167  This rule allows a court “to determine, on the basis of all 
available evidence, what restrictions would be reasonable between the 
parties . . .  It permits courts to fashion a contract reasonable between the 
parties, in accord with their intention at the time of contracting. . . .”168 
Opponents of this rule argue, as they do with the “blue pencil” rule, 
that it reduces or eliminates the incentive for employers to draft narrow 
                                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 164. Smart Corp., 650 N.E.2d at 83-84 (stating the same); Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 5 F. 
Supp. 2d at 683 (holding where a contract is divisible, and where it will not lead to the addition of 
any new terms, courts may “blue pencil” any unreasonable provisions to make the contract 
reasonable). 
 165. Abbott-Interfast Corp., 619 N.E.2d at 1343 (citation omitted). 
 166. Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 64.  In some states this rule has been promulgated by statute.  
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774(a) (2001) (discussing the codified approach).  The 
Michigan law states: 
An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant which protects an 
employer’s reasonable competitive business interests and expressly prohibits an 
employee from engaging in employment or a line of business after termination of 
employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its duration, geographical 
area, and the type of employment or line of business.  To the extent any such agreement 
or covenant is found to be unreasonable in any respect, a court may limit the agreement 
to render it reasonable in light of the circumstances in which it was made and 
specifically enforce the agreement as limited. 
Id. 
 167. Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 65; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 184(2) (1981) (stating, “[a] 
court may treat only part of a term as unenforceable . . . if the party who seeks to enforce the term 
obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing”). 
 168. Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 65.  See, e.g., Ferrofluidics Corp., 968 F.2d at 1471.  The court 
found that the restrictive covenant was reasonable except for the duration of five years, which the 
court reduced to three years.  Id. 
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and reasonable covenants.169  If the worst that can happen for the 
employer is to have the scope of the covenant reduced, it’s a “no lose” 
situation.  Employers are likely to include in noncompetition agreements 
broad, oppressive and burdensome restrictions, thus forcing the former 
employee to either comply with the restraints or bear the burden of 
expensive and often lengthy litigation.  Despite the view of one court 
that “‘[m]ost employers who enter contracts do so in good faith, and 
seek only to protect legitimate interests,’”170 these opponents point out 
that “most employers” is not “all employers.”171 
V. SHOULD NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS BE ENFORCED? 
There are, of course, persuasive arguments on both sides of this 
question.  Those who favor enforceability stress a legitimate need of 
employers to protect the trade secrets, confidential information and 
goodwill developed at considerable expense over a period of time.172  
With the protection of a noncompetition agreement an employer can 
make optimum use of the employee’s skills and talents, and include the 
employee in important and confidential business operations and 
customer relationships.  The employer also has an incentive to invest in 
the employee in terms of training and increasing responsibility, knowing 
that he will not leave and use these new talents elsewhere for a 
reasonable period of time. 
From the employee’s point of view, before signing a covenant not 
to compete an employee is free to decide whether to accept an initial 
offer of employment or subsequent promotion.  It may well be that the 
employee will agree only if additional compensation is offered in 
exchange.  He might require that his present employment be guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                 
 169. See supra note 157. 
 170. Ferrofluidics Corp., 968 F.2d at 1471 (stating most employers who enter contracts do so 
in good faith and seek only to protect legitimate interests).  Courts need to understand employers 
need to make a living too and “are entitled to reasonable protection against the predations of 
unscrupulous former employees.”  Id. 
 171. See supra note 157. 
 172. See Evan’s World Travel, Inc. v. Adams, 978 S.W.2d 225, 233 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating 
a covenant not to compete was an enforceable agreement because of the employer’s interest in 
restraining an employee from competing against the employer using the former employee’s valuable 
information); Agrimerica, 524 N.E.2d at 953 (stating an “activity covenant,” which is designed to 
protect a former employer’s relationship with his customers is enforceable if it is reasonably related 
to the employer’s interest in protecting customer relations); Com-Co Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Serv. Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (stating the employer’s interest in its 
customers will be deemed proprietary for purposes of a covenant not to compete “if, by the nature 
of the business, the customer relation is near-permanent and, but for his prior employment, the 
employee would not have had contact with the clients in question”). 
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to continue for a fixed term, or that he will receive compensation during 
the post-employment period of noncompetition.  If no satisfactory 
arrangement can be reached, he is free to look elsewhere for 
employment. 
Those who oppose enforceability of noncompetition agreements 
argue that too often they give employers more protection than they really 
need.173  As I pointed out in Part IV A supra, a number of states 
expressly provide that, except as to trade secrets and confidential 
information, covenants not to compete are unenforceable.174  It does not 
appear that employers in these states are unduly hampered by these 
restrictions.  Indeed, the fact that a state like California, with all its high-
tech businesses, has such a statute suggests that there may be a strong 
competing public interest in making possible free mobility of workers, 
which can lead to valuable cross-polination and synergies. 
The final question is, if noncompetition agreements are deemed to 
be enforceable at all, should they be enforced only if found to be 
reasonable as originally written — the “all-or-nothing” approach175 — or 
if they can be made reasonable by the “blue pencil” or modification 
approach and then enforced as revised.176  After more than fifty years in 
the business and professional world, I strongly favor the “all-or-nothing” 
approach.  This rule will deter employers from overreaching; they will 
know that if their noncompetition agreements are unreasonable in any 
way, they will be totally unenforceable.  Employers will be discouraged 
from placing unfair and oppressive burdens on employees, leaving the 
employees to seek judicial relief or forego a valuable new job 
opportunity. 
In addition, using the modification or “blue pencil” approach puts a 
heavy burden on the courts.  First, the court must determine whether the 
employer acted in good faith in drafting the covenant.177  Then the court 
must itself re-draft the covenant to make it reasonable.178  It seems to me 
much better to give the employer a strong incentive in the first instance 
to seek to restrain the employee only to the extent of real and clear need.  
Better to forego broad protection, even though it might be desirable, if 
there is danger that this extra reach will cause all protection to be lost. 
                                                                                                                                 
 173. See supra note 157. 
 174. See State Med. Oxygen and Supply, Inc., 782 P.2d at 1275 (stating that a covenant not to 
disclose trade secrets was void and not enforceable under Montana law). 
 175. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 176. See supra Part IV.B.3-4. 
 177. See Data Mgmt., 757 P.2d at 65. 
 178. See supra Part IV.B.3-4. 
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